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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Welcome to another of the *Chicago Open Chapter for the Study of Psychoanalysis's* Newsletter/Journals which endeavours to bring to your attention compelling and even controversial materials for your consideration. This double issue promises to be amongst our best and most interesting. Read on!

In this issue, we again publish important reminders regarding the Division of Psychoanalysis [39] of the American Psychological Association. Once more with feeling, the Division's arrangement with the publishers of the Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing [PEP] data-base is an outstanding opportunity for every member of Division 39 in reference to continuing and broadening their scholarship. I should also like to *strongly* encourage those members of the *Chicago Open Chapter* who are not members of the Division to join – you do not have to be a member of the American Psychological Association in order to be a member of the division – and, receive access to the PEP archive.

In this issue, we are delighted to be able to publish papers by Barry Dauphin, PhD, who, as President of the Michigan Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology, wrote a column on the industrialisation of professions and education for entry into the professions – the paper deals with efforts by the state to now license and accredit yoga instructors. Jerry Gargiulo, PhD has privileged us with his marvelous paper synthesizing quantum mechanics with the psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytical realms. As ever, he brings his searching intellect to bear on an abstruse area of enquiry and renders it understandable and thus, open for greater enquiry and discussion; which is to say, even if one is not a physicist! And, finally, *Chicago Open Chapter* Secretary, Garth Amundson, PsyD, has offered us his trenchant insights and interpretations of psycho-sexual politics as seen through the lens of Camille Paglia's writings and the cultural critiques for which he is known.

You will also note on the masthead for the *Chicago Open Chapter,* our new Treasurer, Nick Johnson, PsyD, who is doing splendidly with this important organisational function. Welcomes are also extended to Kwang Choi, PsyD and Tony Helma, PsyD, as new members-at-large. With new board incarnations come additional ideas and fresh perspectives – all of which are appreciated!

If you have a paper or announcement that you would like to see published in the next edition (for instance, a study group that you are facilitating), please send this to my attention, at the address noted above, or via e-mail at: ddowning@uindy.edu.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not make a pitch to **renew your membership**, if you have not done so. Note we have continued to keep your dues at a modest level! Please consider re-joining us and telling a friend or colleague about us. The Membership Form is included in the back of this issue. Your support is appreciated!

David L Downing, PsyD, ABPP
President

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barry joseph weber
david l. downing

object-relations & self-psychology

a user-friendly primer

Object-relations & Self-psychology: A User-friendly Primer is a much-needed primary text that is a strong introduction to complex theories. The book anchors developmental theory and associated treatment methods alongside the DSM-IV-TR to assist clinicians and students more familiar with this tool in translating these ideas into psychoanalytical ones. The reader will develop an appreciation for the DSM's limitations, finding theories in the authors' text to be of greater clinical value, as the authors articulate the complexity of the lived experience and internal worlds of the persons they treat in their consulting rooms—considerations generally absent in the emphasis on observable behaviour and treatment-by-manual we commonly find today. The authors introduce the reader to a dynamic theory that produces results and offer a wealth of citations to point readers in directions that build on new foundations they will receive. While not written exclusively as a text on short-term psychoanalytical psychotherapy, clinicians working in this modality also will find it an invaluable resource.

"This book is the first of its kind: an introduction to object relations and self psychology for the uninitiated. The authors are true to their determination to present complex theories in plain English and their clinical examples are clear and easy to follow. This is a deceptively simple accomplishment and the more experienced clinicians using this text—perhaps for teaching purposes or review of the field—will appreciate the shrewd intelligence operating in the choice of topics, the way they are presented, and above all the generous and open-spirited point of view that imbues the entire text."

— Christopher Bollas, PhD, British Psychoanalytical Society member

Doctors Weber and Downing have written an exceptionally readable, clear, comprehensive text that introduces the reader to basic concepts in object relations theory and self psychology. In addition to elucidating the conceptual framework of Object Relations Theory, the authors demonstrate the Object Relations understanding of the major forms of psychopathology. This book fills a need for an introductory text in ORT that can be used for teaching this form of contemporary psychoanalytic theory to students who are new to the psychoanalytic way of thinking. I highly recommend this text to all clinicians and students who wish to become acquainted with Object Relations concepts and have an interest in using them in their clinical work.

— Frank Summers, PhD, ABPP, Supervising and Training Analyst, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, Associate Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, Northwestern University Medical School

About the Authors

David L. Downing, PsyD, is Director of Graduate Programs in Psychology and a professor in the School of Psychological Sciences at the University of Indianapolis as well as Dean of Chicago's Center for Psychoanalytic Study. Dr. Downing is a current and former president of many psychoanalytical societies. He maintains private practices in psychoanalysis, psychoanalytical psychotherapy, and consultation in Chicago and Indianapolis.

Barry J. Weber, MDiv, PhD, was Director of Allied Associates in Psychology, a group private practice and practicum training facility in the northwest suburbs of Chicago. Dr. Weber was a certified forensic psychologist and adjunct instructor in psychology at several Chicago-area programs.



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The Psychoanalytic Unconscious in a Quantum World

A Contribution to Interactional Psychoanalysis

Gerald J. Gargiulo, Ph.D

Gerald Gargiulo, PhD is the author of two books: *Broken Fathers, Broken Sons: A Psychoanalyst Remembers; and Psyche, Self, & Soul.* He is the co-editor, along with Charles Spezzano, PhD, *Soul on the Couch: Spirituality, Religion, and Morality in Contemporary Psychoanalysis.* He is the author of scores of papers on various topics including philosophy of science, spirituality, the psychoanalytical treatment of severe psychopathology, amongst many others. He is the former president of the National Psychological Association of Psychoanalysis, the International Federation of Psychoanalysis, and other psychoanalytical societies and organisations. Dr Gargiulo is a member of the International Psycho-analytical Association.

I would like to share some thoughts relating quantum mechanics findings and psychoanalytic clinical experience. Such a comparison offers a way of appreciating psychoanalytic clinical practice that not only helps us situate the respective contributions of psychoanalyst and patient but also one that closely parallels an accepted area of scientific discourse. My hope, as we reflect on such findings, is that you will recognise that there is significant benefit in relating these two disciplines; notwithstanding the fact that we are walking on a bridge of analogy, so to speak.

Werner Heisenberg (1958), one of the founders of quantum physics, stated that this science made a break with what he calls the materialists in science. I will explain what he means by this as we go on. Before doing so, however, it is important to reiterate that the bridge of analogy, which we will be walking on, is one comparing process, not content. What do I mean by that?

What I am proposing — a thesis, so to speak — is that the clinical process of naming, and therefore identifying some clinical material as repressed, is similar to the examining process, in quantum mechanics, resulting in the coming into actuality of a proton particle, for example. In addition to this particular process some of the additional bewildering findings of quantum mechanics provide a satisfying framework for other psychoanalytic experiences. Such experiences, for example, as the obvious difficulty, from an empirical perspective, of explaining the wide spectrum of interpretations, even given a hypothetical same patient, that psychoanalysis offers as basic to resolution of conflict. This certainly becomes an issue with those who equate scientific thought with replicateability. A more basic problem that I am addressing, and where quantum findings can impact psychoanalytic experience, is in correcting the tendency to reify psychoanalytic concepts. Psychoanalytic formulations are metaphors — the repressed unconscious for example — or the defenses are metaphors; not on-

tological realities. What this all means should become clearer as we discuss some basic quantum mechanics findings.

On a popular level, most people have heard of quantum physic's principle of indeterminacy (the uncertainty principle). What does that mean? Briefly, what Heisenberg established is that one cannot know, at the same time, both the location and the speed of a proton, with any certainty. The consequence of this finding has to do with the nature of micro-reality, that is, *probability* as a norm takes precedence over replicable *predictability.* Probability, within this framework, does not describe one event but rather, as Heisenberg (1958) tells us …*during the process of observation, a whole series of possible events* … (p.54). This essential aspect of the micro-world can help us context the fact that there is no way, of course assuming that different analysts are competently trained, sensibly intelligent, and ethically aware, that one can predict their significantly different responses even to a hypothetical same patient. Psychic determinism, I would suggest, has to be understood in view of such a finding. In this regard we can recognise that something can be mechanistic without being determined; but we cannot develop this at the present time. Edward Glover's (as well as others') warnings about the danger of inexact interpretations, comes out of a scientific frame-work that assumes predictability, not probability.

Without the phantasy of *the correct interpretation* and with a firm understanding of psychoanalytic concepts as metaphors, and the awareness of the illusive nature of predictable knowledge, John Wheeler's observation – applicable to physics as it is to psychoanalysis, i.e., *the questions we ask determine the answers we get* – becomes normative for evaluating psychoanalytic clinical practice. But this need not be seen as a hopeless relativism or wild analysis. How an experiment is set up determines the range of observations that can be made; the questions we ask determine the answers we get establishes the complexity of psychoanalytic enquiry not, in itself, its un-scientific personal arbitrariness. Clearly, without a context, there are no facts – facts only exist within a given framework. What quantum mechanics has established is that the probability aspect of psychoanalytic discourse is not unrelated to other areas of scientific inquiry.

Edwin Schrodinger, another founder of quantum mechanics, spoke to this issue when he said that the concept of reality was, in itself, meaningless (see Bella, 1999) – that is, reality is a construct. What we experience as true or not true; as present versus the past; as an object here rather than somewhere else; is all questioned because of the strange findings of quantum physics.

When Heisenberg established that one could not simultaneously know the

speed of a proton and its exact location, that is, to know the one was to be ignorant of the other – he laid an essential cornerstone of quantum physics. Quantum theoreticians, in speaking about how an electron particle, shows itself, talk of *collapsing the wave function*. What is collapsing? In philosophical, as well as quantum terms, potential probability is collapsing into observable actuality. What causes such a collapse? Observation, that is, measurement creates the wave function collapse. Observation, I repeat, creates the reality that is being examined! This is obviously different than what happens in the macro-world – but not so different, I am suggesting, from what happens in psychoanalytic practice when a psychoanalyst, or an analysand, makes an interpretation.

In quantum discourse, the concept of potentiality has more force, so to speak, than is usually recognised in philosophical discourse. That is, it is just as necessary a reality and a possibility as actuality. An electron particle, for example, exists as an energy point when and only when it is observed. Just as what is repressed is known, that is, comes into being, by being identified, i.e., by being interpreted. An electron particle has an actual presence, out of an infinite world of potentiality/ probability, when it is observed, via the wave function collapse. After it is observed, one can only speak of it as a potential reality, once more. An interpretation can likewise be understood as bringing into full conscious awareness, out of the un-countable potential/ probability reservoir of phantasies, memories, hopes, feelings, thoughts, and wishes we humans possess. I will develop this position as our discussion unfolds.

Given the singularity of how a electron might manifest itself – for example as a particle (a quantum), or as a wave, as here rather than there, quantum theory, as we have mentioned, is clearly a theory of probability rather than predictability – notwithstanding that usually it is the highest probability that is observed. This world of probability is often spoken of as *a haze of infinite possibilities* out of which the cosmos comes to be. (I think that such an infinite haze of possibilities might very well be a helpful metaphor for the generic unconscious, but we cannot follow that line of thought at present.) Repeatable, exact measurability, satisfying predictability, is extremely useful for the macro world in which we live. But such procedures are not useful for understanding the micro-world of electrons, neutrons, protons, atoms, etc., which constitute the subject matter of quantum physics – notwithstanding that they are building blocks of our macro world. To recapitulate: in the micro-world something is actually real when it is observed; that is, when it brings about a change in the observer's knowledge; before that, and after that, it is only potentially real, It exists, so to speak, in the realm of infinite potentialities Freud (1923), in *The Ego and the Id*, wrote …*We restrict*

the term unconscious to the dynamically unconscious repressed (p15). This is an observation that is still valid today, not-withstanding the archeological metaphors Freud used when describing such an unconscious. In this discussion I am not addressing the phenomenon of expectable memory loss, nor am I addressing the extensive realm of the non-conscious – that fast collection of physical and neurological processes that enable us to live and to function. I have questioned Freud's use of archeological metaphors when speaking about the repressed unconscious because such metaphors suggest, that the repressed unconscious is somehow a place — i.e., the ever-present danger of reification – rather than simply a psychological experience.

The *repressed* unconscious is, as is obvious, a clinically useful concept. The evoked image of pushing out, burying and/or keeping down is, however, merely a metaphor for an individual's capacity to turn his or her attention *away from.* That is, to experience significant gradations of his or her conscious awareness. We human beings seem quite capable of turning the knob or light switch, if you will, from a very low-level to a high-level and then to sustain our choices (defenses). And, obviously, gradations-of-light is just another metaphor for how we handle the emotionally pleasant and/or unpleasant.

We know, for example, that a brain surgeon can apply an electrical stimulation to certain parts of the brain and an adult subject will correspondingly talk as if he or she were four, five, or six-years-old. Such a phenomenon is not what we mean by the repressed unconscious. That all of our experiences are lodged in our brain does not establish the clinical concept of the repressed unconscious. It bears repeating, although obvious, to note that psychoanalysis, in its clinical application, is a psychological endeavour, not a neurological one. We are not neurologists. Given the complexity of the psyche, however, we can use all the metaphors and neurological findings we can get, — as long as we keep in mind that our psychoanalytic concepts are not lodged anywhere – they only exist as points of reference for our understanding. The unconscious system has to be understood comparatively, like the limbic system; one is measurable, the other is descriptive. (Such a perspective does no violence to the reality that most of what we designate as the internal world is latent, is below the intensity of consciousness.)

I believe that the *collapse of wave function* model can be a useful analogy for what we are doing in clinical practice, when we make an interpretation. When an analyst brings his or her total emotional/feeling, intellectual and physical presence in response to what is likewise brought by the patient — (I include all the vicissitudes of projective identification on both sides) — and selects, by conscious intention, or

by creative surprise, to bring something into more conscious focus, to give an interpretation of what is not available to the patient's full awareness, then, from a clinical perspective, we can speak of creating the repressed unconscious. The interpretation makes what was potentially real, — actually real — very similar to what the collapse of the wave function achieves.

What potentiality are we talking about? A psychoanalyst, it bears repeating, out of his or her own world and capabilities, in response to the analysand's world and sensibilities, responds by turning the light of conscious awareness onto selected material. Usually the vehicle for such a response is language, informed by feelings, but this is not always the case. One reason why a psychoanalysis is theoretically unending is due, as previously mentioned, to the unimaginable number of stored life experiences, memories, phantasies, dreams, and thoughts each human being has. Consequent upon such an array of material, any interpretation is, of necessity, subject to the here and now of experience and to the norm of probability, not replicateable predictability.

Obviously, just as any micro experiment has to be carefully set up the equivalent in psychoanalysis is likewise the situation. An analyst must bring as broad based intellectual understanding and affective sensitivity he or she is capable of to the process, just as a patient must bring his or her pain, emotional history, intellect, and a deep desire for personal honesty. "Lifting repression," in actuality, is enabling the patient to turn the light of his or her cognitive and emotional consciousness onto the more dimly lit aspects of his or her memories, phantasies, thoughts and feelings. What I am focusing on in this discussion, I need to repeat, is process, not content. I am not addressing "the what;" that is, the content of an interpretation.

If we are looking in the macro world for a useful framework to situate the variability of analytic practice we are looking in the wrong place. Alfred North Whitehead, the noted mathematician/philosopher, speaks of organising reality in terms of *process*. His understanding is that everything is in a process of coming to be and a fading away. Consequently he, along with quantum physicists, does not accept any hidden *substance;* that is, any *thing-in-itself.* Heisenberg (1958, p.129) addresses the same issue when he talks of the scientific materialists or, more to the point, the *dogmatic realists* [things exist in themselves] in contradistinction to what he follows; namely, the *practical realism.* Applying absolute predictability [dogmatic realists] to psychoanalysis reduces psychoanalytic experience to an untenable concreteness, despite the macro-world's need for predictability.

Freud, as we know, operated within a Kantian and positivistic scientific model. In one of his many attempts to

describe the unconscious he compared it to Kant's *thing-in-itself*. No wonder there is such a danger to reify psychoanalytic concepts. There is no need, according to Heisenberg as well as Whitehead, to posit Kant's *thing-in-itself*. Heisenberg (1958) states that … *the thing-in-itself, is, for an atomic physicist, if he uses this concept at all, a mathematical structure; but this structure is – contrary to Kant - indirectly deduced from experience* (p.91). I quote this not-withstanding Gerald Edelman's (2006) observation that *the very complexity of the brain's repertoires* [means that] *every act of perception is to some degree an act of creation and every act of memory is to some degree an act of imagination (p.100).* I read that as saying that the brain modifies. It does not impose the categories of space and time, for example, as Kant maintained. They are existent realities. That is, we can know the world, even the illusive, puzzling imprints of the micro world that we study. Put in psychoanalytic terms we might say that we do not just dialogue with internal representations, we talk, fight, love, and hate real objects in the world in which we live. There is just one world, so to speak, of unactualised potentialities – or, in John Wheeler's terms, one haze of infinite possibilities.

Wave/particle duality (Bohr's principle of complementarity) implies that *every electron, every photon, everything, in fact, has both wavelike and particle like aspects.* (Greene, p.185). A particle, for example, can go through a double slit opening before it registers on a screen, and it can actually go through both slits at once and interfere with itself! We are talking about one proton – not two. In our macro-world the principle of contradiction holds – in the micro-world it does not hold. More puzzling, still, is that a particle seems to be able to go back in time. Richard Feynman, the noted American physicist, speaks of this strange phenomenon with his theory of *sum over histories*. In this same area of inquiry Wheeler's delayed *choice experiment* (Greene, p.186ff) suggests that in some way the past depends on the future. That is, one can change some of the variables mid-experiment and such changes will alter the events at the beginning of the experiment! These are very strange findings — so much for linear thinking and a simplistic notion of cause and effect as well as object/subject dichotomy. There are obvious comparisons here with Freud's thoughts about primary process thinking. The *modus operandi* of the psyche, I believe, is much closer to our experiences of the quantum world than to the micro-world in which we seemingly operate.

I would like, now, to turn our attention to another important finding of quantum theory, a finding that deeply affects our understanding of our world and our psyche. I am alluding to what is known as *quantum entanglement*. The short translation of quantum entanglement is that reality – at its foun-

dational micro level – is non-local. What does this mean? Briefly, it means that two particles, that are related, can and will affect each other, notwithstanding how distant they are from each other. They simultaneously affect each other despite the fact that no information, even carried at the speed of light, passes between them. The reality of entanglement, which has been repeatedly verified, has extensive application. It is particularly helpful, I believe, in overcoming the operative assumption of a strict dichotomy between inside/outside and subject/ object. Such dichotomies have plagued psychoanalysis since its inception. What entanglement seems to suggest is that the micro-world is one-completely -inter-active, inter-dependent system. Location is not an absolute – the micro -world is non-local — a theory that Einstein strongly disagreed with until it was definitively established by John Bell (1987), in the nineteen sixties. If we live in a cosmos that is one system, then it is not an exaggeration to say that each atom in such a cosmos is related to every other atom. The full import of what this means is probably beyond our human capacity to understand.

By way of analogy we can say applying this entanglement finding to the question of mind. That is, subjective awareness is deeply entangled with the individual historical and social communities in which we live; to modify one is to modify the other. Such a conclusion is the basis of my thoughts about mind, which I will discuss at the end of this paper.

But if entanglement is true, how can we explain the relatively predictable, distinguishable objects, of world in which we live? In other words, given the probability nature of the micro-world and assuming that the wave-function collapse is a correct description, as well as the non-local quality of the micro world, how can we explain the experience and the appearance of our everyday object-filled world? Quantum theory addresses this problem by positing what it calls *decoherence.* As best I understand this term it refers to the phenomenon that posits an un-countable number of wave function collapses, operative within this one cosmic system, which are constantly interacting/interfering with each other and generating the observable/ experienced macro world. The world of larger and larger objects destroys what is referred to as coherent superposition. *Decoherence washes out,* [according to Bell, 1987] *quantum entanglement; putting previously entangled objects into a state where they behave as separate objects (p. xxxiv*).

Notwithstanding our day-to-day experiences of the macro-world, Whitehead (1925), fifty years before Bell's confirmation of quantum entanglement, wrote, …*In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio -temporal standpoint mirrors the*

world (p. 114). Such a perspective suggests that a strict division between subject and object is not possible, a strict division between inner mind and outer world is not possible, and a solipsistic reading of an autonomous "I" is not possible. All such considerations have import for psychoanalysis. Speaking to this last point, Heisenberg (1958) concludes that, *Natural science…describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning…it makes the sharp separation between the world and the "I" impossible (p.81).* I (2004, 2006, 2010) have tried to address some of these matters in previous publications; we have yet to evolve a psychoanalytic practice that takes full account of such conclusions.

In this staggeringly complex cosmos in which we live we can barely understand where we are, who we are, and what is. What we seemingly know is what one measures, via collapse of the wave function. We obviously also live in a world of emotional knowledge, aesthetic awareness, inference and possibly even thought transfers. Whitehead addresses such issues but he does so involving his rather obtuse categories. Quantum theory, in its understanding of a world of infinite possibilities out of which the world of probability comes to be, evokes awe and mystery. I (2004) have defined mystery as *the ever-receding horizon to one's knowledge.* The experience of awe does invoke a profound silence within us. We need mystery and awe in our lives – the task is to avoid mystification.

In this short discussion I have not mentioned *the many worlds theory* of Hugh Everett, who gives a different reading to the collapse of the wave function i.e., which function is also known as the Copenhagen interpretation. I have not addressed Edwin Schrodlinger's conviction, in any detail, that the concept of reality is necessary but ultimately meaningless concept. In view of the notion of entanglement such topics need extensive discussion. Nor have I have mentioned John Wheeler's Anthropic Principle – an attempt to explain, teleologically, the structural reality of our world in view of the presence human beings. All of which have applicability, I believe, for psychoanalytic reflection.

Before I close our discussion, however, I would like to return to the issue of mind and offer some further thoughts – notwithstanding the complexity of the issue and the brevity of my presentation.

Mind is best thought of, I would suggest, as a bridge, not just a personal possession or an exclusive subjective experience. It locates us within a particular community at a particular historical moment. It has to do with the experience of meaning and the "location" of meaning, which arises in and from the communities in which we live. Mind, as I have mentioned, is a statement about our entanglement with such communities; it cannot be appre-

ciated as if it is solely an internal possibility. In this regard I have built my understanding of mind as related to community upon Donald Winnicott's, as well as M. Cavell's (1988), thoughts. Winnicott (1958) writes that mind *is then no more than a special case of the functioning of the psyche-soma*. Elaborating on this he further notes that *the word psyche here means the imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings and function, that is, of physical aliveness (p.244*). Whitehead (1925) addresses a similar perspective when he writes, that *the organic starting point* [for an understanding of mind] *is from the analysis of process as the realization of events disposed in an interlocked community (152.).* This issue, clearly, needs extensive discussion, particularly in view of the concept of entanglement. Unfortunately time does not permit such a discussion.

What I hope I have conveyed, in this short paper, is a rudimentary appreciation of how some of the findings of quantum mechanics might help psychoanalysts understand what they are doing by providing them with alternate models for their work. Models are alternate tools for aiding our understanding – they are not meant to be confining theories, demanding allegiance. Respect for insights given by our best thinkers should never suggest an exaggerated awe for the thinkers themselves. Just as we have to be on guard against reifying psychoanalytic concepts, we have to avoid "reifying," so to speak, our theoreticians. Most of the authors I have read in quantum theory have avoided that kind of distracting adulation – even for their greatest thinkers. In my reading of psychoanalytic authors, I have not always found the same degree of restraint – the lack of which is more than unfortunate for any endeavour that searches for truth.

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Licensed Psychotherapists Petition On Confidentiality

To Whom It May Concern:

We, the undersigned psychotherapy professionals:

Support client confidentiality as a fundamental principle of psychotherapy and as a basic right of our clients,
Object to the decline in protections for confidentiality under new federal regulation,
Object to unquestioning adoption of corporate medicine's standards of practice.

We therefore:

- Object to the idea that all records must be kept in a manner to be reviewed by third parties,

Object to any standard requiring psychotherapists to give every client a diagnosis.

Such requirements provide little consumer protection or service, may stigmatize people, prevent people from seeking treatment or obtaining insurance in the future, unnecessarily invade privacy, and compromise patient trust. When a psychotherapist and a client both agree, it is appropriate 1) for the therapist to keep no records at all of the therapy process or to keep them under a pseudonym and/or 2) for a therapist to forgo giving the client a diagnosis.

This petition is not intended to circumvent laws that require report of threats to human safety.

When signed, please return to:

Licensed Psychotherapists' Petition On Confidentiality, AMHA-USA
PO Box 4075
Portland, OR 97208-4075.

Mary Kilburn
mbkilburn@earthlink.net

"Presidential column for the Michigan Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology February newsletter"

V. Barry Dauphin PhD
University of Detroit-Mercy

Dr Dauphin's column touches upon the egregious trends toward the industrialisation and proletarianisation that is demolishing the mental health professions – especially psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical psychotherapy. The Chicago Open Chapter respectfully thanks Dr Dauphin for his permission to re-print his comments here – *Editor*.]

Welcome to the New Year. Having a place where psychoanalytic thinkers can educate themselves and interact with colleagues interested in psychoanalysis is valuable, especially in times when there are risks to educational freedom.

Although I might be accused of being a worrywart for articulating concerns about risks to liberty in professional education, the news has a way of validating some of these concerns. Please bear with me and allow me to cite a recent example.

What if I told you that one state had enacted educational regulations concerning vocational training that threatens freedom of speech via the state's act to regulate content? Well, the state of Virginia has passed regulations concerning yoga-teacher training of all things. Apparently, the state is afraid of having bad karma if the training of yoga teachers were left unregulated. In order to teach individuals how to become yoga instructors, classes must become licensed by the state as *vocational schools*, which is costly initially and in an on-going basis. Non-compliance with these regulations makes the class/school (or even the lowly single instructor) subject to substantial fines. These regulations also include an orgy of on-going paperwork in order to document that the school's compliance with state regulations. The cost of compliance runs into thousands of dollars and over a week of full-time administrative work (if you would like to read more about this case, you can visit the website of the Institute for Justice: www.ij.org) Why should psychoanalytic psychotherapists give this a second's thought?

Well, the implication of laws, such as these, is that the government becomes a gatekeeper for who can speak to or on a topic. Teaching classes is essentially speech, and one would presume this kind of speech should be protected by freedom of speech. The yoga teacher instructors do not go about yelling "Fire!" in crowded movie theaters. Usually the First Amendment is construed as protecting the right of individuals to decide for themselves what is worth saying and who is worth listening to, with worth including fees. Should a yoga instructor require government permission to speak about yoga, as teaching someone how to be a yoga teacher is speaking about yoga. Currently anyone in Virginia can practice yoga and can teach yoga without government permission, but not teacher yoga teachers. But wouldn't the logic eventually lead to teaching yoga or practicing it? How is a slippery slope to be avoided?

Oh, but yoga-teacher education is not psy-

choanalysis, one might say. That is correct — it is not considered part of healthcare and not considered subject to malpractice, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers are. Teaching yoga teachers is a vocational activity for which one might presume an enormous amount of freedom. So when the state exercises power over areas of education usually presumed to be given a wide berth in terms of acceptability, we should consider the potential ramifications for professions that already have licensing laws, which are justified on the grounds of having a compelling interest in protecting the public. This situation in Virginia is not an isolated instance. Other states are doing the same thing with yoga teaching as well as with such urgent areas as pet-grooming, bar-tending, and typing. In essence many states are getting into the business of regulating content. According to these kinds of regulations, one cannot speak about yoga instructional strategies and get paid to teach yoga teachers without a government license, although one is free to engage in other kinds of teacher instruction in other content areas without such a license. Will the state decide which yoga instructional strategies are worthwhile and which are not? Perhaps EBYT (Evidence-Based Yoga Teaching) will catch on, so that schools will have to be EBTY compliant. Wouldn't those be interesting regulations to read?

A typical rationale for such laws is that the state wants to protect students from a substandard education. However, we are talking about adults and not children. The state is deciding which speech is worth listening to and which is not. The state is acting *in loco parentis*. Just reading about it could cause one to tense up, become upset, tighten up the shoulders. Perhaps a session of yoga would help… oh, you see the problem. Yoga instructors have debates about instructional methods. Of course so do psychoanalytic thinkers. I have the luxury of knowing my way is best, but the rest of you are out of luck. Perhaps the state can decide.

The US Supreme Court has already indicated that there is no legal difference between paid and unpaid speech (See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind 487, U.S. 781, 801 (1988) ("[A] speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak."). Thus, the fee for speaking is not what is important. The logic of this sort of regulation invariably leads to more regulation to fix problems created by the original. Compliance becomes more burdensome, to the point where the economic impact and the administrative time needed for compliance can squeeze out the little person completely. I have already seen how local chapter compliance with APA/Division 39 CE became a big job, and the Division's efforts to comply require a position dedicated to it. What starts as a fairly simple process begins to morph into a logical monstrosity. It is not monstrous yet for local chapters or for Division 39, but that is just a matter of time. It is certainly a much larger pain in the neck than it used to be.

Of course, most states are involved in mandating continuing education for psychologists in the guise of protecting the public. I have already seen that the state of Michigan has an interest in mandating that pain management be included in the teaching of graduate-level psychology. The state is not

in a position to do this at present but has sent graduate programs a very long list of topics in pain management it would like to see in a graduate psychology curriculum. This appears to be a sign that some bureaucrats in the state would like to see pain management become a required topic in any future mandatory education requirements for psychology licensure. It already is required for social worker license renewal. Ethics is also required for social work license renewal. How is this not regulation of content? Thus, for social workers 6 hours of their 45-hour mandate are spoken for with respect to content. What is the bureaucratic logic of stopping there? Despite the *zeitgeist* of evidence-based everything, there is a dearth of evidence that these kinds of mandates accomplish much beyond providing an income stream for some speakers or professional organisations.

We are all familiar with efforts within the broader professional community and elsewhere to marginalise or de-legitimize psychoanalysis. Regulations, such as the mandate for pain management education, are not the result of a trip by Moses to Mount Sinai. Rather such regulations are invariably the result of lobbying, usually by fairly powerful interest groups. In the case of pain management requirements, it is highly likely that many states have adopted this requirement due to an intense lobbying campaign by the Citizen Advocacy Center, a large nonprofit organisation, which has lobbied states vigorously to include pain management into all healthcare professions' mandated education. I am not implying that psychoanalysis faces some urgent risk of being prohibited from being taught or of psychoanalytic groups having to be licensed by the state to offer psychoanalytic content. However, waiting until something is urgent before giving thought to the machine-like logical implications of yoga-teaching regulations is waiting too long. *Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must… undergo the fatigue of supporting it (Thomas Paine: The American Crisis, No. 4, 1777).*

MSPP has been trying to create a variety of educational offerings and even to keep up with the times (e.g., pod-casting format), so that members can engage in the most individually navigated forms of self-education and to have multiple forms and modalities of content available in the eventual likelihood that the state of Michigan will require some form of documentation of educational experiences as part of some form of continuing education mandate, whatever name is given to this mandate. The executive board has remained alert to the shifting winds of technology and of regulation of the profession. Although such activities are not construed by some as being "psychoanalytic", we have put much "psychoanalytic thought" into the process of these decisions and aim to enable all those interested in psychoanalysis to continue to educate themselves as richly as possible.

HOW WE MATTER

Division of Psychoanalysis (39) • 31st Annual Spring Meeting **APRIL 13–17, 2011 • NEW YORK CITY**

Psychoanalysis in the 21st Century

Psychoanalysis has been in a process of extremely rapid transformation, a result of change in both our theories and the broader culture. This state of flux creates a tension between our values and ideals and patterns emerging in society. Most of us entered the field of psychoanalysis envisioning ourselves working multiple times a week over a number of years with patients who essentially share in our belief that emotional growth and change occur in the context of an intimate relationship with a psychoanalyst. Yet, this does not represent what is actually unfolding in our consulting rooms. Our contemporary culture offers the ever-evolving knowledge of neuroscience and biology, quick release from unwanted feelings via medication, speedy access to information and relationships via the Internet, and treatment models that claim to produce better results more quickly. We along with our patients are overwhelmed by professional and lifestyle ambitions thwarted by economic crises. This state of affairs may deter potential patients and psychoanalysts alike from the relatively unhurried pace that is associated with psychoanalytic treatment.

As analysts we meet people where they are when they seek treatment. Thus, we are each no doubt experimenting with how to make ourselves relevant and responsive to the changing expectations, concerns, and presenting problems of our patients. Our creative challenge as analysts is to strike a balance between analytic tradition and a changing marketplace, a tension that marks much analytic work today. If we are successful, we may use the changes and crises in our culture as an opportunity to evolve our own thinking, without without sacrificing our fundamental values of attention to process, affect and symbolic meaning, and our belief in the centrality of the unconscious.

CONFERENCE CO-CHAIRS
Jill Bresler, Ph.D.
Andrew Eig, Ph.D.

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
Lewis Aron, Ph.D.
Neville Symington

We would like to invite you to participate in a collaborative exchange of ideas about the current state of psychoanalysis. Proposals may address the following or related questions:

- What is the role of a psychoanalyst and psychoanalytic theory in the 21st century both inside and outside of the consulting room?
- How are we preserving our belief in the psychoanalytic value of unconscious processes, transference, countertransference, and symbolic meaning as we integrate new knowledge? For instance, what is the role of the analysis of the transference in the context of a "problem" oriented therapy?
- How do we impart the value of studying psychoanalysis to young professionals who find that the market forces them to pursue other paths of training? Conversely, what does the next generation of psychoanalysts have to tell us about how to make psychoanalysis relevant to the world they live in?
- What is the relationship between contemporary thinking about culture, spirituality, new technology and psychoanalysis? What is the future of interdisciplinary studies for psychoanalysis?
- In a results oriented society, what is it that we are offering patients? And, how will we guide them to that end—what is it that we actually do?
- To what extent do we work collaboratively (even if only in thought) with other professionals from whom our patients may simultaneously seek help? To what extent do we integrate techniques from other therapeutic modalities, or seek consultation from other practitioners?

PRE-DISTRIBUTED PAPERS

Participants are encouraged to submit presentations that are geared towards fostering discussion, that is, relatively brief papers that invite audience feedback. As in previous years, several papers will be made available to participants before the meeting to facilitate conversation. Early career contributors will be given special consideration, with several panels to be devoted to their work.

SUBMIT ALL PROPOSALS VIA THE WWW.DIVISION39.ORG WEB SITE

FOR EACH SUBMISSION:

- INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL SUBMISSIONS CAN BE FOUND ON THE WEB SITE. Please follow the steps as indicated.
- FOR PANELS ONLY: Panels may include two, three or four presenters. ALL PANELS will be limited to 1 hour and 50 minutes. Discussion between presenters and audience is strongly encouraged.
- FOR PAPER SESSIIONS: These will be limited to 1 hour. Discussion between presenters and audience is strongly encouraged.
- FOR DISCUSSION HOUR/MEET THE AUTHOR: These sessions will be limited to 50 minutes. Please specify issues to be addressed in this discussion or informal format.

Each submission must include a "Continuing Education Information Sheet." The sheet and instructions are available at www.division39.org by clicking the appropriate choice in the "conference" menu.

NOTES:

1. **All presenters must register and pay for the conference. NO EXCEPTIONS. Please consider this when putting together your program.**
2. Only three (3) proposals will be accepted per person. Scheduling decisions are non-negotiable.
3. Psychoanalytic Psychology has the right of "first consideration" for all papers and panels under the aegis of the Division of Psychoanalysis (39).
4. Please direct all questions regarding submissions to the Conference Co-Chairs:
   Jill Bresler, Ph.D.; drjbresler@aol.com
   Andrew Eig, Ph.D.; eigandrew6@gmail.com

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION: SEPTEMBER 3, 2010

"Internal Strife in Psychoanalysis and the Eternal Clash of Sexual Personae"

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Abstract

"Internal Strife in Psychoanalysis and the Eternal Clash of Sexual Personae"

This article uses the work of cultural critic Camille Paglia to analyse the long-standing history of internecine strife in psychoanalysis, the most recent examples of which are the sometimes-heated debates between proponents and critics of the post-modern turn in theory and practice. Following Nietzsche, Paglia describes Western culture as defined by an endless clash between Apollonian and Dionysian principles. The Apollonian principle derives from a conservative, law-making, boundary-making ethos *that Paglia identifies with what she calls archetypal masculine "sexual personae". Dionysian energies oppose Apollonian orderliness through impish, disordering, law-and-boundary-breaking agendas that Paglia identifies with the archetypal dimensions of femininity and its personae. I apply this paradigm to suggest that unconscious sexual tensions, and their archetypal patterns of expression through masculine and feminine personae, fuel the perpetual battles over theory in our psychoanalytic sub-culture.*

Author Biography

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We generally speak of a professional group as being "membered," that is, connected in a unified body. Nevertheless, membership in the psychoanalytic world also includes the experience of "dismembership," by which I mean indoctrination into a professional sub-culture dominated by the on-going clash of warring perspectives that attack the unity of the professional body. Many psychoanalysts are dismayed by the insularity of diverse psychoanalytic views and the inability of different schools to engage in reasoned dialogue about differences, such that psychoanalysis appears to be what Freidlander (1993) calls a "mass of disputing doctors." Summers (2006) decries the long-standing culture of internal contention in psychoanalysis, and points to the cult-like quality of the sometimes ruthless in-fighting amongst psychoanalytic factions. He suggests that our profession behaves like fundamentalist religious devotees, establishing group solidarity along lines of collective splitting and idealising/devaluing defenses that threaten to destroy our credibility as a science and practice of healing.

In this essay I will go further and say that we *are* religious devotees, in the sense that we are under the sway of archetypal psychic constellations whose power over us becomes all the greater due to our ignorance of their existence and influence. I will attempt to show that it is these primordial and, to the ego, uncanny dimensions of human experience that drive the aforementioned tensions in our field. I draw on the views of cultural critic Camille Paglia (1990) to argue my point, as presented in her book Sexual Personae; Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Dickinson.

Paglia is a self-admitted intellectual anachronism. She is practically alone amongst contemporary North American academics in asserting what she calls "the unity and continuity of Western culture," and, in the style of a nineteenth-century scholar, situates socio-cultural changes within larger historical cycles dominated by archetypal forces of pagan sex and aggression. In an intellectual era that champions cultural relativism, a Rousseauian presumption of the innate goodness of human nature, and the virtues of democracy, she vehemently argues that Western civilization (and all that is civilized within the human animal) derives from a primitively absolutist, amoral, and un-democratic source – what she calls the

discriminating, "hierarchic," and "fascistic Western eye" engaged in an endless, often ruthless, and ultimately unwinnable battle with chthonian nature[1].

Among Paglia's more controversial stands is her acceptance of popular sexual stereotypes as reflecting essential truths about human nature. This is part of her general celebration of popular culture, an arena in which she finds ancient Western archetypes of male and female desire—the "sexual personae" of her book title—alive and well. She believes that these personae (Latin for "masks"), and the innate sexual tensions between men and women that they express, have largely been banished from meaningful integration into contemporary "highbrow" scholarly discourse. Consequently, asserts Paglia, they resurface in "low-brow" popular culture in the "pagan spectacle" of garish modern fashion, the bizarre and ghoulish scandals of tabloid journalism, and pornography, for example.

Paglia draws on anthropology, history, aspects of classical Freudian theory and Jungian archetypal psychology, and, most prominently, art and literary studies to argue that the pinnacle achievement of Western culture is its invention and celebration of the idea of personality. She says that the Western "cult of personality" is founded on a male protest against the regressive pull of chthonian maternal nature, and argues that the greatness of the West lies in its collective delusion that the discriminating, desiring masculine "eye" can triumph over primordial Great Mother nature. Paglia argues that golden ages of Western culture are fueled by the nervous energy and aggression of masculine personae, whose relentless creativity is fueled by the need to overcome the imperious dictates of the Primitive Mother. This is accomplished by creating culture whose transcendent creations are male attempts to soar defiantly above the unreflective, amoral compulsions of biology. Hence, notes Paglia, "Most of western culture is a distortion of reality. But reality should be distorted; that is, imaginatively appended" (p. 13).

Here, Paglia's affinity for Freud becomes clear: the mental "appending" of reality to which she refers is modelled on the male physical appendage of the penis, the phallic protrusion around which worshipful cults have always formed across cultures. Paglia suggests that the phallic thrusting of the self into the world "is a male curse: forever to need something or someone to make one's self complete. This is one of the sources of art and its historical domination by males" (p. 28). The Western idealisation of the agentic subject—appearing as the self-responsible actor of Judeo-Christian faith, humanistic and psychoanalytic personality theories, and entrepreneurial capitalism—is one such artistic appendage to nature, expressing a male narrative of freedom from, and mastery over, its earthly source in Mother Nature.

However, says Paglia, Mother always has the last word. Art and the world of culture, like manhood, are unstable and transitory, always teetering on the edge of nature's abyss. Ironically, the final fall off the edge originates from destabilizing forces within the male psyche itself, as depicted in the Oedipus myth: man's sense of having mastered feminine nature becomes heady and intoxicating, leads to grandiose excess and, finally, decadence and collapse, she says.

The devastation of the gay male community by AIDS is the most current example of this phenomenon, notes Paglia. The peculiarly male striving for transcendence has always been

1. Over the years politically and culturally liberal reviewers have excoriated Paglia's ideas as expressions of socially regressive neoconservatism. I will not attempt the arduous task of mounting an *apologia* for Paglia here, other than to note that even her harshest critics often concede the uniquely compelling quality of her intellectual vision.

with us as a core feature of the Western canon. Gay men embody this striving in purer form, seen in the vast, utterly disproportionate contributions of homosexual males to the arts, she says. Hence, a recent popular Television show speaks smartly of the "queer eye" of gay male aestheticism, and features a group of gay men cheerfully attempting to lend style and panache to drably-attired straight males. Following Paglia, I se this is as a pop culture tribute to the traditional role of the male homosexual as keeper and invigorator of Western culture. Paglia argues that social changes of the late nineteen sixties allowed direct, de-sublimated expression of the sexual desire underlying this vast creativity; a celebratory, super-charged release of male eros that was often indiscriminate and promiscuous because it was fueled by one-sided, hence mad, hopes of freedom from woman and the fantasy of an all-male cosmos. The ecstatic rejoicing continued through the 1970's . . . then nature returned, crashing the party and replete with horrors.

Hence, in this view, culture occurs in cycles mimicking the rise and fall of the penis: it begins with the soaring fantasies accompanying erection, and ends in the impotent flaccidity of disillusioned realism. In this cycle of rise and fall, we find the origins of the Western literary genre called "tragedy," notes Paglia, a male narrative of grand hopes dashed. She asserts that the so-called "late" phase of capitalism in which we find ourselves currently is one such period of deflation and decadence. Phenomena such as the dissolution of clearly-defined social roles (under the influence of philosophically relativistic post-modern humanisms), and the mindless celebration of the Western cult of individuality in the *Circus Maximus* of capitalism, may foreshadow a precipitous, classically tragic collapse into nature's abyss.

The sharply defined, domineering Western persona is culturally unparalleled — our greatest achievement, says Paglia. Yet, she asserts, built in to the process of the development of self is its own undermining, which is why historical periods dominated by the cult of the transcendent and authoritarian Western male personae are inevitably followed by a regressive collapse into its opposite . . . obscurity, dissolution, and a fascination with the liquidity and malleability of brute nature, the Great Mother, who is depicted in the statuary of the earliest civilizations as the perfectly rotund—by implication pregnant—source of Being. A feature of this decline is a descent into a collective state of sado-masochistic return to the embrace of the goddess. Says Paglia, "The hardness of our personalities and the tension with which they are set off from nature have produced the West's vulnerability to decadence. Tension leads to fatigue and collapse; 'late' phases of history in which sado-masochism flourishes" (p.36).

In this essay, I draw on Paglia's provocative thinking to analyse a key source of conflict in our discipline: the current tensions between the advocates and detractors of the post-modern trend in psychoanalysis. The post-moderns (by which I mean psychoanalytic theorists who incorporate post-modern philosophical paradigms into psychoanalytic theorizing, most of whom are identified with the American "relational" and "inter-subjective" schools) say that they are expanding psychoanalytic thinking into the inter-personal and social realms, which they see as having been ignored by Freud's allegedly narrow and isolating focus on the intra-psychic. Post-modern psychoanalysis challenges the notion of a unified, coherent and hence consistently knowable self (at least, a self knowable by referring to stable, universal categories of meaning), noting that such integration is made impossible by the fluid, ever-changing interpersonal and social contexts within which persons are embedded. The modernist, Freudian wing of psychoanalysis (composed mostly of psychoanalysts identified with "classical," "contemporary classical," and

"neo-Freudian" perspectives) resists this trend, arguing that post-modern meta-psychology threatens to undermine or even eradicate psychoanalysis as a profession by effacing the classical focus on the unconscious; a dimension of mind that it defines as quite separate from the inter-personal and social contexts within which we find ourselves. Modernist Freudians also criticize the post-moderns for denying or losing sight of the self-responsible functioning of the agentic self, which is the correlate of an ontologically separate subjectivity.

A la Paglia, I interpret the sometimes-heated debates about this issue as a clash of two important Western sexual personae: boundary-making and reasoned Apollo, representing masculinized, conservative "old school" Freudianism, pitted against the revolutionary, feminized, and impishly disordering post-modern Dionysus, the underminer of structure. About these key Western personae Paglia (1994) comments, "I see the dynamic of history as an oscillation between Apollonian and Dionysian principles, order and energy, which become, at their extremes, fascism or chaos" (p. 93). Framing my essay around the theme of fragmentation, I forward the idea that in the convulsive disintegration of our sense of professional unity and community, occurring under the strain of internecine conflicts about the post-modern revisioning of self as a disintegrated plurality, we may detect the eternally recurring clash of Apollonian and Dionysian perspectives.

The Dionysian Response to Uncertainty: Parallels with Classical Greece

The collective religio-social fervor informing psychoanalytic politics results in sometimes-nasty disputes over the symbolic "territories" of competing theories, as different camps vie for ownership of the professional body. Hence, our metaphoric professional body is regularly "torn to pieces," as the saying goes, by the devotees of this or that sub-group: classical, ego-psychological, object-relational, self-psychological, relational, inter-subjective, feminist, Lacanian, and so on. An unprecedented sense of anomie and ineffectiveness is the result.

The metaphor of dismemberment brings to mind a religious group of ancient Greece: the Bacchae. This folk-cult celebrated the forces of disorder, derangement, and the fragmentation of taken-for-granted social realities and states of mind; initiates, mostly young men and women (the latter called Maenads), sought transcendence through sometimes-orgiastic ceremonies. Bacchic rites entailed a communal psychic immersion in the spirit of their patron god, the playful, eternally youthful and amoral Dionysus. He goes by other names, each one imparting a different aspect of the phenomenon of surrender to primal chthonian forces: Mainomenos, "the raving/mad one"; Lysios, "loosener" or "liberator," and so on (Otto, 1965).

From a Jungian standpoint Dionysus is an archetypal trickster, a playful pervert compulsively and gleefully poking holes in all we think of as familiar, stable, and whole; exposing it as weirdly multiple and uncannily changeable. The Bacchae are an Earth-cult, and Dionysus is a god reflecting the human experience of Earth's endless cycles of death and rebirth. Hence, impermanence and changeability are among his chief qualities: Dionysus symbolises nature's cataclysmic power to shatter all we think of as integrated, controllable, and lasting, including the very psychic organ of knowing itself, the mind. The god's role as dismantler and dethroner of the ego is famously expressed in his titles "god of wine" and "god of the vine," the giver of intoxicants that liberate by enfeebling or dissolving humans' sense of self-direction and agency. Ego-subversion is also implied in his

role as patron god of the theatre: he is the divine presence behind that violation of human identities called "acting," in which the boundaries defining the self are continually and creatively transgressed. Bacchic ceremonies also enacted Dionysian boundary-smashing through the frenzied ritual decapitation (and possibly devouring) of sacrifices, animal and perhaps human, while music and dance further fueled devotees' sense of *participation mystique*.

The cult of Dionysus acted as a counterpoint to, and implicit critique of, the largely order preserving character of socially dominant cults, among the most prominent of which was that of Apollo (Monick, 1987). Apollo's sect was associated with the sun, pointing to the god's transcendence of Earth and the imperatives of nature. This is expressed in Apollo's divine sponsorship of law, philosophy, and the arts, activities concerned with the preservation of culture as a bulwark against natural forces. While the egalitarian nature of Greek spiritual tradition allowed Dionysus an official place among the most prominent gods in its pantheon, equal in stature to gods like Apollo, Dionysus's de-constructive madness was nevertheless an object of tension for mainstream Greek society. Hence, another of Dionysus's attributes is that of a misunderstood and feared god, one condemned and tortured as a usurper of social norms. The Bacchic ritual rending of sacrifices also reflects this dimension of the god as suffering social pariah: Dionysus is embodied in the tormented animal. So too with the ritual consumption of heady wine, with crushed fruit of the vine pointing to the deity's spiritual brokenness. Yet, Dionysus is continually reborn, triumphant over his oppressors and their taken-for-granted world: just as mangled grapes lie fallow and ferment, eventually yielding a liberating elixir, Dionysus is likewise transformed and transfigured in the midst of his own destruction.

Dionysus makes a compelling psychoanalytic case study. He is a male who remains intimately acquainted with the world of women, an eternal "mama's boy" unwilling to renounce his claim to the maternal breast. Dionysus's closeness to the feminine realm originates in the traumatic loss of his human mother, Semele: while pregnant with the boy, she is devoured in a fire sparked by the fabled lightening bolts of her divine lover, Zeus. Zeus rescues unborn Dionysus from the inferno of his mother's womb and implants him in his thigh, a homosexual "second birth" transmitting his divine nature and powers to the child. But Dionysus cannot forget his maternal source, and dedicates himself to honoring her memory in the most heart-felt of all possible ways: through identification and imitation. Therefore, Greek literature typically refers to Dionysus as male, but this gender identification is uncertain and subject to continual change, undercut by the fundamental liquidity of his nature. Dionysus is psychologically and spiritually promiscuous— "polymorphously perverse," as Freud would say—incorporating all opposites into himself, including the ancient dualism of male and female identities. Writing in the fifth century CE, lexicographer Hesychius asserted that the Bacchae participated in the bi-sexuality of the Dionysian persona, with male devotees donning women's garb to lead the annual parade of worshippers to the temple at Delphi, for example (Schmitz, 1875).

Here I rely on that understanding of Dionysus as presented to us by Euripides (480–406 BCE). Euripides' final and most dramatically powerful play, The Bacchae, was first staged posthumously at the Theatre of Dionysus in 405 BCE It emphasizes the darker, deconstructive, and socially/psychologically undermining dimensions of the god's actions in the human world. Euripides' "take" on Dionysus interests me because it prefigures the postmodernist attack on staid, dependable structures of traditional meaning by thousands of years, and hence puts the uncertainty of our

own time in a larger historical context. Says Paglia, our experience of disorder and decay caused by the post-modern debunking of grand narratives and universal meanings is neither new nor unique. Rather, it reflects an eternal recurrence . . . and so, she notes, "even in the fifth century . . . a satiric response to Apollonianized theater came in Euripides' decadent plays" (Paglia, 1990, 6).

The Dionysus of Euripides bears an uncanny resemblance to many post-modern deconstructionists, in that he too is a vehicle for undermining our smug self-confidence that we may know and hence victoriously manipulate reality. I find parallels between the social context in which Euripides wrote and that of our own, post-modern time: both periods are beset by nihilistic doubt about questions of value, morality, and purpose. Hence, Euripides appropriated the ancient character of Dionysus specifically as an artistic vehicle through which to depict the crumbling of the Athenian spirit due to a debilitating crisis of meaning. This crisis had been developing for many years, and was rooted in different, though inter-connected causes. The effects of the protracted Peloponnesian War, a conflict pitting Athenian-born Greeks against fellow Greeks of Spartan descent, drained both states financially and spiritually. The disheartening effects of this seemingly interminable conflict interacted in toxic ways with developments in the social and political spheres to fuel an ominous sense of what in our era sociologist Weber (1958) calls socio-cultural "disenchantment."

Sophism appeared at this time, an early philosophical relativism emphasizing the form of argument over substance of content, a development that Plato and his academy famously attempted to counter. Further, according to Bates (1906), the democracy so carefully established by Pericles deteriorated into disorganised mob rule during this period. "Liberty degenerated into license, and culture . . . soon became superficial. . . . " (p. 166) he says, adding that "at Athens men's minds were filled with a restless desire and striving after novelty. The less the results of Athenian politics came up to their conception of the greatness of the sovereign demos, the more did men question the existing principles of public duty and morality, hitherto regarded as fundamental" (p. 168).

In *The Bacchae*, we meet Pentheus, a beleaguered king fuming angrily about the intrusion of the sensual and freedom-loving Dionysus and his band of revelers into his realm. Euripides pens the tensions between the two characters as sexual in nature, a clash of Apollonian masculine authority with Dionysian gender-bending. Hence, Pentheus's main complaint against Dionysus is his unnerving bi-sexuality. The Penguin translation by Vellacott (1953) has the ruler practically oozing machismo as he contemptuously describes Dionysus to his court, calling him "an effeminate foreigner" with "golden hair flowing in scented ringlets, and . . . the charm of Aphrodite in his eyes" (p. 125). Against the advice of his counsellors, Pentheus refuses to consider the possibility that Dionysus is divine. He arrests, harshly interrogates, and then imprisons Dionysus, who is initially passive about his fate.

Greek audiences would have understood Pentheus's arrogant denial of Dionysus's godhood to be profoundly impious, and as meriting the final, savage act of revenge meted out to the king by the deity. Hence, at the climax of Euripides's drama, Dionysus the god reveals his divine power, destroying the prison and emerging to confront his tormenter. Dionysus's spirit enters into Pentheus, who falls into a psychotic-like trance-state induced by the offended god. The Bacchae garb the pathetically disoriented king in women's clothes in preparation for his ritual slaughter. Then, in one of the most memorable and horrific scenes of Western theater, Pentheus is torn limb from

limb by the enthralled worshippers, including his mother.

The Dionysian narrative of a hybrid, part-human, part-divine messenger's meek submission to cruel and disbelieving social authority, followed by triumphant epiphany, figured in the rise of another Eastern Mediterranean cult only five hundred years after Euripides, that of Jesus, the Christ. The Christ-cult absorbed and appropriated these and other elements of Dionysian mythology, but, being a monotheism, tolerated no competitors. Bacchic worship, like almost all other Mediterranean mystery religions, was soon marginalised or driven underground by the monopolistic newcomer.

Yet, Dionysus is indestructible, born anew in each age: Bacchic religion continues to provide a compelling template for understanding the proper attitude toward periods of social disorientation like that confronting Euripides. Hence, in the modern era, Nietzsche (1872/2009) built his seminal work *The Birth of Tragedy* around the character of Dionysus as the model of a redemptive orientation toward a human condition made profoundly uncertain by the decay of what he called Western "Apollonian" principles of order, law, and civic ritual. Nietzsche's use of the Dionysus myth was an early step in the articulation of his mature "perspectivist" philosophy. Perspectivism is arguably the first purely post-modern rendering of the human condition, paving the way for post-modernism's current popularity by rejecting the grand narratives and belief in objective, universal truths of Enlightenment-era reasoning, in favor of individual visions of reality.

Nietzsche's reliance on Dionysian lore was part of his larger project: the prescription of a redemptive regression to what he saw as the free-spirited embrace of multiplicity that characterized pre-Christian polytheisms, and which he insisted is missing from the modern world due to the influence of Christian monotheism. The monotheistic emphasis on oneness, unity, and harmony ("One God, One Communion, One Faith") deadens expression of the self in all its multifaceted incongruity, he thought. However, asserted Nietzsche (1882/1964) in *The Joyful Wisdom,* "In polytheism man's free-thinking and many-sided thinking has a prototype set up: the power to create for himself new and individual eyes. . . ." (p. 178). Nietzsche's return to our pagan, polytheistic past is part of his attempt to foster a hopeful nihilism: the One God and His hegemonic domination of perspectives may be dead, but the gods and goddesses are reborn.

Many psychoanalysts, concerned to repair potentially destructive tensions within the field but aware that there can be no meaningful compromise between certain fundamentally differing psychoanalytic views of human nature, have advocated a radical embrace of diversity and multiplicity as a solution. This is a reflection of the "post-modern" stance so popular among our number. Nietzsche's self-described hopeful brand of nihilism is deeply imprinted on all post-modern projects, including this one. In homage to Nietzsche, post-modern intellectual trends assert that our ways of knowing reality and the very fabric of our Western social networks have fallen apart, if indeed they were ever truly coherent to begin with. The existential center does not hold, goes this way of thinking, and moreover, it is incorrect to try to impose any over-arching order on this state of affairs.

From a Paglian perspective, the post-modern embrace of the forces of dis-integration indicates that we are in a decadent "late" historical era. This is a period marked by a fascination with plurality and fragmentation in art, philosophy, and daily life, and a worshipful devotion to the exotic and bizarre end-products generated by attempts to hobble a world-view together from the scattered bits and pieces of culture

(i.e., the recent celebration of chic "fusion" cuisine among the monied classes, with cross-bred Latino-African and Euro-Asian concoctions displacing steak and potatoes). Like Pentheus, psychoanalysts are witnesses to the entry of the post-modern Bacchae and their celebration of the forces of multiplicity, the titillating, chaotic clamor of diverse perspectives.

Current North American psychoanalytic discourse reflects an infatuation with the idea of the psyche as a plurality, a focus that undermines the already-teetering edifice of Western self-hood. This turn toward "many-ness" is seen in, among other places, the deconstructive metamorphizing of the psychoanalytic vision of selfhood, resulting in a perplexing array of newly-minted visions of human nature. This is evident in the overwhelming abundance of papers, books, and conferences with titles like "What Sex is an Amaryllis? What Gender is Lesbian? Looking for Something to Hold it All" (Magee and Miller, 1996), "How Many Selves Make a Person?" (Lachmann, 1996), "Love Thy Neighbor as Thy Selves. . . ." (Goldman, 2005), and so on. The post-modern intellectual vein within North American psychoanalysis has now expanded to include the idea that multiple, contrasting states of awareness and intentionality, sometimes referred to as multiple selves or multiple subjectivities, are an appropriate model of the mind's nature (e.g., Mitchell, 1993; Bromberg, 1994; Aron, 1996).

The above-mentioned developments indicate that psychoanalysis is no longer certain about what it is investigating: engorgement of our discipline with a plethora of new "selves" expresses our post-modern doubt about our capacity to truly know the object of our study. Uncertainty about what we are investigating leads to confusion about how comport ourselves with patients. In post-modern psychoanalysis there are as many techniques and styles of clinical interaction as there are selves and self-states! A common, characteristically post-modern solution to dilemmas about technique is to embrace the forces of unreason. Thus, in much post-modern psychoanalysis, acceptance of the notion of an intrinsically fragmented, dissociated, and/or "multiple" self-structure is accompanied by the idea that tolerating and/or fostering states of uncertainty and "not-knowing" are key to good clinical practice. This phenomenon is evident in articles with titles such as "On Thinking We Know What We're Doing" (Schwartz, 2002), and the strangely indecisive epithet of the American Psychological Association Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) 2008 Conference: "Knowing, Not-Knowing and Sort-of-Knowing: Psychoanalysis and the Experience of Uncertainty." But there are indications that some are becoming nervous about the potential for chaos resulting from this celebration of unknowing. Given the above, the didactic focus of the 2010 Division 39 conference, entitled "Wild Analysis: From Freud (1910) to Now (2010)," may imply growing anxiety about things getting out of hand in the post-modern consulting room.

Most psychoanalytic post-moderns acknowledge the potential for dangerous disorientation in the theoretical territories where they venture. Generally speaking, I think they are largely sincere about this. But Dionysian energies are curious, impetuous, and unrestrained, compulsively pushing limits to achieve ever larger, lusher experiences of aliveness. Such forces can usurp our good intentions. Hence, it comes as no surprise to find that some post-modern theories excitedly laud the notion of a fragmented self and its ineffability. These theories often idealise the states of "not-knowing" or deconstructive "unknowing" that they take to be the correct technical stances of analysts toward analysands, and of analysands toward their own inwardness.

This is aptly illustrated in the case of Lacan,

who proposes a model of human subjectivity as intrinsically and irreparably self-alienated, and hence an impenetrable mystery to itself and others. For Lacan, we are overcome by the enigma of our nature from the moment of birth, as we encounter the uncanny, dis-integrated otherness of the body; so, early in his career Lacan (1966) referred to "the body in pieces," meaning the infant's normal state of alienation from a synthetic experience of his or her physicality. Admittedly, we cannot fairly call Lacan post-modern, as he apparently wishes to maintain some notion of an interior, enduring human "subject" that is fundamentally distinct from its environs. But *what* a subject! Lacan is popular among many post-moderns because of his view of human interiority as mysterious and ultimately inscrutable; that is, a subjectivity that forever eludes capture in the static structures of language. Lacan dislikes clarity and coherence, as any reader of his turgid texts will quickly note. Rather, he revels in obfuscation, happily rendering ego-based categories of meaning irrelevant. This informs his manner of engaging patients, yielding a therapeutic technique that is a deconstructive *via negativa*, a Zen-like shattering of what he sees as our defensive insistence on the reality of "self." Lacanian obscurantantism is boy-like, gleefully provocative like a grade school class clown, purposefully calculated to create madness in those who insist on the "adult" values of order, clarity, and predictability. In this regard, it is classically Dionysian.

Given his embrace of this decadent agenda, it is not surprising to find that Lacan is partially indebted to the thinking of post-modernist Bataille, whom he studied, as well as to the more general French intellectual climate of resistance to Anglo-American ego-veneration. Paglia might say that such a teasing and nonchalant dismantling of the ego could only come from a Latin country like France, where Anglo-American Protestant seriousness (heir to the Western Apollonian tradition) is held in check by the dominance of Catholicism and its indebtedness to the polytheistic pagan nature mysticism flourishing in and around pre-Christian Rome.

A quote from post-modern analyst Fairfield (2002) clearly conveys the dismemberment of the post-modern self, and the resulting plunge into obscurity of the notion of selfhood. Here the term "self" is the first casualty. Because "self" implies something essential, coherent, and universal, "post-modernists often prefer the less specific term *subjectivity*," writes Fairfield. And what does she mean by "subjectivity"? It is agonizingly hard to tell. The author says the term refers "as loosely as possible to a person's experience of being in the world. It may or may not coalesce into something as bounded as a *self*, and it is unspecified as to interiority, agency, homogeneity, degree of consciousness, and any relation to the body, the physical and social environment, or a supernatural realm" (p. 71). That's loose, for sure . . . a self that will not (or cannot) coalesce into something definable. I would assert that this is Bacchic mysticism reborn, the self-same attempt to reframe psychic, moral, and cultural fragmentation in a positive light, as the epiphenomena of virtuous diversity and possibility. Paglia (1990) notes that "Plutarch called Dionysus 'the Many' " (p. 239). This is also an apt descriptor for the state(s) of our psychoanalytic community, theory, and practice under the post-modern umbrella.

Paglia's theory soars, always striving for higher, more Olympian vistas. But now let us try to bring her project down to earth a bit, by citing a few representative cases of the sexual and sadomasochistic tensions fueling our psychoanalytic profession's storied history of internal strife.

Selected Examples of Clashing Sexual Personae, from Freud to Now

One line of interpretation of Freud's professional quest describes it as an over-determined attempt to construct an all-male universe, what Paglia would deem a classic expression of Western Apollonianism. An important proponent of this view is French philosopher and psychoanalyst Irigaray (1985). She describes Freud's theoretical insistence on the centrality and desirability of the penis (which men idealise and anxiously protect, and women envy but, from their state of lack, can only seek to emulate by having a baby) as his attempt to posit a male-centric "homosexual structure" at the core of the human condition. A Paglian understanding of Freud would say that his vision harkens to the boy-love of classic Greece culture from which he drew primary inspiration for his theories: everything progressive in human personality and culture matures in relation to the phallus, which, in this schema, displaces the vagina as primal creative source. Yet, this masculinized rendition of human nature is based on denial and hence is infused with anxiety: male protests and plots cannot securely erase awareness of the Great Mother's primacy. As a result, constant defensive shoring-up of the homoerotic narrative "man-as-creator" is required to maintain the illusion of freedom from Her bidding.

This defensive male homo-eroticism may help explain the harsh treatment Freud doled out to colleagues who questioned or modified his theories. Freud zealously defended his authorial position in psychoanalysis, insisting on his role as first among equals when it came to determining theoretical orthodoxy. For example, Jung (1961) indignantly recounts Freud having remarked to him that he wanted to make what he called an "unshakeable bulwark" out of his psycho-sexual theory, so as to resist what he called "the black tide of mud (of) occultism" that he saw as threatening to contaminate psychoanalysis. It is likely that Freud's remark was, in part, a response to the threat he perceived in Jung's interest in occult metaphysics, which collided with, and perhaps "muddied," key tenets of his theories. A Paglian perspective on this event might suggest that mud, particularly in a black tide, is an unconscious metaphor for the obliteration of idealised male consciousness and its valorization of reason, by the dark, primal slime of Mother Earth, our common source and final destination.

Occultism and its conjuring of nature's daemonic forces is a characteristic preoccupation of Dionysian personality types. Hence, in the above, I am arguing that Freud sensed and dreaded the Dionysian element in Jung's thinking, an element presumably also reflected in Jung's character. Now, to say that Jung was a Dionysian figure hardly requires an inferential leap. The

The Swiss psychoanalyst explicitly and publicly committed himself to infusing psychoanalysis with neo-pagan mysticism, a perversely polytheistic broth of Western religions and philosophies, many from forgotten pagan and occult traditions: pre-Christian Germanic folklore, classical Greek myth, neo-Platonic—or "Gnostic"—Christianity, and mediaeval alchemy, to name a few.

This strange theoretical stew aimed to create the conditions for the birth of archetypal, Nietzschean-*cum*-Wagnerian heroes in the consulting room. It is significant in terms of my thesis that Jung conceived of the heroic, "individuated" human types through the eyes of another one of his major influences, the philosopher Nietzsche, whom I cited earlier as inaugurator of the post-modern agenda. Arguably, Jung's individuated person is the practical equivalent of Nietzsche's (1883/1969) *Übermensch*: in English, one who has gone "above" or "beyond" what Nietzsche (and later Jung) deemed vacuous, de-spiritualized moder-

nity, by shrugging off allegedly abstract and deadening Enlightenment-era rationality and universalism so as to realise inner, animal sources of vitality and wisdom arising from the collective ancestral unconscious.

The notion of Jung as embodying and promoting Dionysian forces in psychoanalysis is not my own. Rather, it first occurred to Jung himself. In a telling letter to Freud, Jung (1910/1974) explicitly references his struggles with the clash of Apollonian and Dionysian agendas, and his increasing devotion to the latter as the guiding principle for psychoanalysis. In this correspondence, Jung mentions having received an invitation to lecture at the Bern Institute for Ethics and Culture, part of this organisation's attempt to align itself with psychoanalysis. Jung grouses about availing himself to the group, writing that "the prospect (of lecturing to them) appalls me." He lets on that this mood is due to the press of his struggle to define the guiding principle for his work, given his loss of faith in socially-normative Judeo-Christian morality and its vision of human nature. At this point, Jung frames his struggle as a clash of archetypes and their associated value systems; perhaps thinking of Nietzsche, he laments, "at present I am sitting so precariously on the fence between the Dionysian and Apollonian" (p. 293). He then sheds his self-pitying and ambivalent tone, forcefully denouncing the Bern group as an example of spiritually empty modernity, one alienated from the mystic archetypal forces that bestow life with vigor. "An ethical fraternity, with its mythical Nothing . . . is a pure vacuum" (p. 294), he storms.

Finally, Jung's initial complaint that he is "on the fence" regarding the clash of Apollonian and Dionysian views suddenly and decisively gives way to resolution: Dionysus must be resurrected. Specifically, Jung tells Freud of his wish to, as he says, "transform Christ back into the sooth-saying God of the vine, which he was, and in this way absorb those ecstatic instinctual forces of Christianity for the purpose of making the cult and the sacred myth what they once were—a drunken feast of joy where man regained the ethos and holiness of an animal," and noting that "this was the beauty and purpose of classical religion" (p. 295). Of course, here Jung's reference to the "God of the vine" means none other than Dionysus.

In this letter to Freud, Jung clearly indicates his adherence to Nietzsche's program of promoting a redemptive regression to pre-Christian, pagan amorality and its energies, an agenda for which Dionysus is the most natural of symbols. Like Nietzsche, Jung idealised Dionysus as the model of a new human type, one that transcends the herd and its timid, orderly, that is, Apollonian precepts. Given this, it is no surprise that Wolin (2004) cites Jung as an important early source of the post-modern dethroning of reason, its concomitant celebration of the affective and irrational as the new basis for deciding questions of value, and its embrace of multiplicity (prefigured in the polytheism central to Jung's vision).

Tensions between the two men finally broke into the open when Jung accused Freud of seeking omnipotent control of theory development. Freud, incensed, countered with an authoritative interpretation: Jung was acting out an Oedipal rivalry, complete with unconscious death wishes toward him, he said. The private spat became public spectacle, and, in 1914, ended in Jung's resignation from his positions in the International Psycho-analytical Association. This was the second major rupture in the psychoanalytic body in three years: Freud's other student, Alfred Adler, had angrily left in 1911 after similar disputes with Freud. Like Adler, Jung denounced Freud. He left for Zurich, and, also like Adler, founded his own school. So, within six years of the first International Psychoanalytical Congress in Salzburg in 1908, the tradition of calumny and di-

visiveness in psychoanalysis was already firmly established.

Most modern commentators suggest that both Freud and Jung were correct about the other, though only to an extent. It seems to me that, of the two men, only Freud was willing to consider the heavily over-determined nature of their clash. Even at the end of his life, Jung defensively fixed blame for the demise of their collaboration solely and simply on Freud's authoritarianism. For example, years before his "falling out" with Jung, Freud puzzled over the reasons for another, *literal* kind of falling out in the form of his fainting spells in Jung's presence. He finally analysed these spells (which occurred twice) as having dual origins: perhaps predictably, one is sexual, the other aggressive. The latter line of interpretation, emphasizing aggressive competition between rivals, is the most well known in psychoanalytic lore. In this view, Freud's faints were hysterical responses to certain of Jung's off-hand comments that Freud believed revealed patricidal wishes to overthrow him as authorial ruler of the psychoanalytic movement. But this view is arguably incomplete. After all, Freud was accustomed to conflict, and continually rose to meet personal and professional assaults from all corners. Why, then, would he faint in response to this particular rival, rather than adopt his characteristic, well-honed fighting stance? The former, sexual, line of interpretation makes this behaviour comprehensible: upon self-analysis, Freud considered that his faints were also classic hysterical responses to the press of unconscious homo-erotic wishes toward Jung.

Blum (1999) elaborates on Freud's homoerotic conflicts, suggesting that Jung's challenges were intolerable to Freud; in part, because Freud was unconsciously and possessively attracted to him—in the grip of a masochistically -tinged "family romance." Blum adds that Freud feared losing control of the energetic and independent Jung, who served as an erotically idealised self-object for the older man.

Psychoanalytic historian Prochnik (2006) says that Freud's relation to Jung evidences homoerotic wishes to be held by a strong man, an aim consciously unacceptable to Freud and thus concealed behind a compensatory, alternately doting and critical paternalism. Indeed, after the first of Freud's faints over lunch in Bremen it was the vigorously athletic Jung who scooped up the limp and helpless Freud, placing him on a nearby sofa, relates Prochnik, who concludes that the incident was an enactment of "(Freud's) fantasy of inhabiting the typically symptomatized female body" (p.93).

But it was the authorial/authoritarian aspect of Freud's persona that ultimately determined the course of his relation to his junior pupil. It would seem that Freud simply could not stand (pun intended) to surrender to phantasies of homo-erotic, paternal control over the one he had affectionately dubbed his "son" and "crown prince." Paglia would find sado-masochism hidden in these playful monikers: their use implies that Freud is king; hence, ruler of what Irigaray calls the implicitly homosexual, psychoanalytic kingdom generally, and of Jung particularly. But Jung refused to be Freud's erotic "boy toy;" that is, a psychologically unformed and thus teachable younger male of the kind preferred by another famous men's club, the rulers of classical Greece. This doomed the relationship. *A la* Paglia, we may say that Freud's fainting spells reflected the exhausted collapse of a too-rigid psyche, a "phallic" personality over-extended (as it were) by obsessive attempts to remake the world as a masculine playground. Freud, the Apollonian king-*cum*-phallus, went suddenly and pathetically limp when confronted with his failure to dominate the Dionysian energies of his younger counterpart. We may infer that Freud both desired and dreaded the perverse Dionysian impishness emanating from the

younger man, an approach-avoidance conflict leading to breakdown. So, like Euripides' Pentheus, Freud lost his Apollonian self-command under Jung's spell, succumbing to the girlish histrionics that he consciously loathed.

Prochnik argues that what he calls the "homoerotic underpinnings" between Freud and Sandor Ferenczi resulted in a similar, albeit less openly, divisive conflict. Therefore, Prochnik notes that, on a trip through Italy and Sicily with Ferenczi, Freud found himself becoming progressively more irritated by his companion. On one occasion during their journey, the two men fell into an argument about control of the content of a paper they had agreed to co-author. The theme and course of this dispute was all too predictable: Ferneczi accused Freud of monopolistically dictating the paper to him *in toto*, to which Freud retorted that it was Ferenczi, and not he, who sought omnipotent control.

Following the tension-filled trip, Freud attempted damage control, writing in conciliatory tones to Ferenczi of what he believed to be the undercurrent of homosexuality in their clash (Freud, 1910/1993). For this outbreak of libido, he held himself responsible, noting that the incident "brought to light the resistance against my own homosexual drive components" (p. 221). Yet, even in the midst of contrition, Freud found an opportunity to assert his mastery, confidently claiming to Ferenczi that, since the trip, he had analysed and overcome the unruly feelings, with a resulting expansion of his ego strength: "I have succeeded where the paranoiac has failed", quelled the self-congratulatory Freud (p.222).

There is reason to think that Freud's conciliatory tone with Ferenczi was largely motivated by a wish to avoid a professional schism, and not genuinely reflective of his true assessment of the affair. We come to this conclusion by examining the contents of a letter Freud wrote to Jung during the Italian journey, in which he cruelly castigates his fellow traveler. Using terms both critical and strangely desirous, Freud relates that Ferenczi is "dreamy in a disturbing kind of way." He goes on to gripe that Ferenczi is "too passive and receptive, letting everything be done for him like a woman;" and sarcastically jibes that "I really haven't got enough homosexuality in me to accept him as one" (p. 293). We may question the last line . . . does Freud protest too much here? In any case, I find this passage to be uncannily similar to Pentheus's hostile denouncement of the feminized Dionysus as penned by Euripides, the self-same compound of contempt and attraction that later ensnared Freud in a lovers' battle with Jung.

Freud's sometimes curious, though ultimately disparaging, treatment of Ferenczi is important to our thesis because Ferenczi is generally acknowledged to be a key source of that strain of psychoanalytic theory that developed into the now-popular North American "relational" movement, which is heavily influenced by post-modernism and endorses changes in theory and technique that, arguably, feminize or "maternalize" the analytic situation. For example, the Dionysian fluidity of boundaries that we have identified as part of the post-modern project has its forerunner in Ferenczi's (1928/1955) practice of "mutual analysis," in which he and the patient would switch roles, with the patient acting as analyst for a spell. This role-juggling is an affront to the classical Western notion of personal identity. Who is who? Perhaps it doesn't matter, said Ferenczi, whose experiment in trading identities with certain patients challenged the premise that egos are ontologically separate. But Freud could only have deemed this another dangerous excursion into muddy mysticism; an attack on the Apollonian fixity of ego boundaries.

The idea that Ferenczi embodied Dionysian energies is not my own latter-day literary em-

bellishment, but a feature of his personality that was easily recognizable to Freud himself. According to Emery (1995), Freud explicitly acknowledged the Dionysian element of Ferenczi's work and persona in the form of a telling and prescient gift. Ferenczi was a member of Freud's "secret committee," a group of six psychoanalysts personally selected by Freud to protect the theoretical purity of the fledgling discipline. When Freud presented each of the six with a gold ring carrying a Greco-Roman intaglio, the band he selected for Ferenczi bore the image of Dionysus, flanked by two awestruck Maenads. Emery goes on to argue that Ferenczi promoted what he calls a "Dionysian itinerary in psychoanalysis," in that he found his true calling in the analysis of "Dionysian ego-libidinal states—in shock, fragmentation, intoxication, ecstasy, stupor, and their creative-destructive interplays" (p. 269).

Ferenczi's feminized rendering of the psychoanalytic situation has emerged in our time as the dominant model of how to relate to patients, an outcome perhaps speaking to the irresistible allure of the chthonian. As only one of many examples, post-modern theorist Stern eagerly welcomes the intrusion of unexpected transformative forces into the consulting room. This is reflected in his notion of "unformulated experience" as important to psychic change. According to Stern, the meeting of two minds in the consulting room conjures up formerly unarticulated perspectives, which may spontaneously appear in the psychoanalytic dyad. Stern (2003) defines this as a kind of virgin birth of unforeseen and redemptive meanings, metaphorically "conceived" within the analytic dyad in the form of language, noting that "unformulated experience is material that has never been brought into consciousness, not material that has been ejected from it" (p. xii). It is not surprising that Stern describes this birth of meaning in hospital delivery room language, such that his writings sometimes read like do-it-yourself obstetrics manuals. For example, he notes that we must first patiently await the arrival of new meaning with an attitude of even-tempered restraint. After this, Stern instructs, "the function of attention can be focused and used to help and coax a fully formed product to emerge in awareness. It is only after the initial period of invisible germination, however, that volition can contribute" (Stern, 1983, p. 70). And, we might add, be sure to have the forceps handy. I propose that Stern's post-modernist view symbolically endows male analysts with the ability to give "birth" to new (mental) creations, a form of mimicry of the Great Mother signaling the post-modern male's identification with the newly idealised feminine order.

Stern is sanguine about the influx of Dionysian energies into the formerly Apollonian world of psychoanalysis, perhaps an indicator that he is indebted to the Ferenczian tradition, particularly to its optimistic belief in the curative possibilities of interpenetrating subjectivities. But, as with the process of physical birth, the life-bestowing, creative aspect of Dionysian boundary diffusion also has a dark and violent side. Says Otto, Dionysus "is the mad ecstasy which hovers over every conception and birth and whose wildness is always ready to move on to destruction and death" (p.141). Hence, perhaps because they intuit the interface of life and death forces in our Dionysian era, some psychoanalytic post-moderns evince an anxious, sometimes fascinated preoccupation with the influx of destruction and death into the most intimate moments of human relatedness. This is explicitly present in a series of so-called "dialoguing" articles published in Layton and Fairfield's (2002) collection of post-modern psychoanalytic writings entitled *Bringing the Plague: Toward a Post-modern Psychoanalysis*. Two authors, gay cultural critic and activist Michael Bronski and psychoanalyst Muriel Dimen, discuss the meanings of male homosexual, sado-masochistic sex. The-

se articles illustrate Paglia's view that decadent, "late" history is dominated by sado-masochism, as male-created cultural forms teeter on the edge of nature's abyss.

Bronksi starts the dialogue in a chapter entitled "Doctor Fell," in which he describes in journal entry form various sado-masochistic sexual encounters. (The title is taken from a nursery rhyme that Bronski likes because, he says, it inspires both "longing and dread," perhaps signifying his intuitive grasp of Freud's ambivalent take on the nursery situation.) Bronski loves Walta, his life partner, but also seeks sexual adventures with other men, for reasons that are never explained (though we are left to presume that a quest for transcendent sensual thrills is one likely reason). His S & M sessions with one, an ex-Marine and physician named Jim, is the article's centerpiece. Interspersed with descriptions of the ecstatic, hallucinogen-fueled pleasure he and Jim find in cutting each other with scalpels while suspended from the ceiling in the glow of a ritually candle-lit apartment are Bronksi's anguished introspections about whether his activities with this man are "truthful"; that is, whether they are fair to Walta, express or defend against emotional authenticity in a broader sense; and other related concerns.

To me, Bronski's thoughts about truth and authenticity come off as wooden; like most men, both gay and straight, he is at his best when contemplating the sheer physicality of sexual desire. And here there are no disappointments: the sex in "Doctor Fell" is super-heated fascist high art. Under the sway of Bronski's aestheticizing "queer eye," Jim becomes depersonalized; rendered a stage prop in an extravagant psychosexual drama fusing torment with pleasure—*The Bird Cage* meets *Caligula*. Paglia would say that this is consistent with the male personae, which express themselves most naturally in the act of projecting themselves into the world in creative acts, an element of which is the ruthless objectification of reality.

Also interesting from a Paglian perspective is the death-defying audacity of the man-on-man sex described by Bronksi. I find that these acts embody (pun intended) both the heroic male quest for super-natural transcendence and the compulsive, self-destructive desire for return to nature's womb. Hence, Bronski acknowledges that throughout his S & M sessions he strongly suspects that the blood flowing from Jim's veins is likely contaminated with the HIV virus. One would normally suppose that any inkling of the presence of this killer disease would provoke a hasty retreat from blood sport. But, for Bronski the risk of death actually fuels *eros*, acting as the ultimate sado-masochistic aphrodisiac in a testosterone-fueled game of tag with chthonian nature.

And so Bronski continues on, spattering blood from his lover's veins, madly consumed by desire in much the same way as the devotees in Euripides's *Bacchae*. Bronksi comments on his consciousness at these times: "I feel polymorphously perverse, dazed by my own lack of inhibitions…" (p.287). Dionysus clearly runs the show here, acting in his characteristic role of infusing the ritual dismemberment of the integrity of mind and body with irresistible sweetness. At several points, Bronski describes the sado-masochistic torment of his partner in religious terms — what he calls "Catholic kitsch." Hence, contemplating Jim's beautiful, naked torso hanging limply from the ceiling, he muses that he looks like a "martyr in a Renaissance painting" and asks rhetorically "Is this transcendence?" (p.288) Paglia would say 'yes' . . . and therefore the prelude to death. Indeed, later we are told that both Jim and Walta eventually die from AIDS, and that Bronksi himself is unsure as to whether or not he is contaminated with the deadly virus. At this point, a hidden meaning of the article's title becomes clear: Jim, the physician, *is* Doctor Fell, that is, one who "fell" victim to

dreams of male transcendence. This is an ending straight out of Euripidean tragedy.

Like many post-modern writings, Dimen's analysis of the above, entitled, "The Disturbance of Sex: a Letter to Michael Bronski," is largely non-committal, eschewing grand narratives and hard-and-fast conclusions by tentative meandering between acceptance of Bronski's quest for truthful self-expression (and a related rejection of pathologising notions of S & M as perverse self-deception), and occasional attempts to nudge him to examine what he hopes to get out of all this. But ultimately, Dimen does not hold back from making one sweeping assertion; namely, that "Doctor Fell" depicts post-modern irony: S & M, like all sex, simultaneously expresses and obscures key truths about human relationships, she asserts. Dimen's commentary contains some interesting observations, but these are not my focus here. Rather, it is the fact itself of her interest in sado-masochistic gay male sex that interests me, as I think this preoccupation implies something about our profession's collective mental state. From a Paglian view, Dimen's interest is fully consistent with the post-modern spirit, which is voyeuristically drawn to the deconstructive (and destructive) Bacchean dynamics of late history, the post-modern spectacle of dismemberment and dissolution that Freud would have deemed an aspect of the death instinct.

In light of the above, it is strange that Dimen does not mention the obvious presence of the theme of death in Bronski's article; an instance, I think, of the discomfort many post-moderns have in acknowledging the "destructive" elements within their "deconstructive" endeavour. Rather (and, yes, ironically), it is non-psychoanalyst Bronski who must point out this elephant in the room. He does so in his final response to Dimen, entitled "Sex, Death, and the Limits of Irony: a Reply to Muriel Dimen," in which he notes the failure of Dimen's post-modern reading of his article to address fundamental issues of Being and non-Being. Says Bronski, "Irony has helped me survive as a gay man in this world (including the AIDS epidemic), but I have found it useless in the face of death; living and dying feel stark to me, with no in-between space for negotiating irony or even comfort" (p.321). Here Bronski, having followed post-modern logic to its end, emerges not with ironic musings about the multiplicity of truth, but with darkly Paglian conclusions about the pitiless quality of chthonian nature, and the horrific dualism of life and death. So, ultimately, "the plague" to which the book's title refers is no post-modern artifice of language or social construction that annoyingly "plagues" essentialist presumptions (as the editors intended this phrase to be understood), but a cruel, gruesome, and unyieldingly objective phenomenon.

Considering the foregoing, it is no shock that among some of its more vocal critics, the post-modern turn in psychoanalysis evokes apocalyptic visions of the demise of the Western ideal of the unitary and boundaried personality, and its replacement with the new ideal of a dangerously permeable, fragmented, and chaotic self that they see as subjectively vacuous and devoid of agency. These critiques often have the moralizing urgency of the ancient Hebrew prophets, those archetypal defenders of monotheistic unity against profligate, polytheistic "many-ness."

So, for example, Mills (2005) roundly criticizes post-modern relational meta-psychology as based on multiple, ever-changing "contingencies" rather than universal truth(s), asserting that such a meta-physic seeks to negate the "entire history of Greek and European ontology" and introduces disruptions to the "established order or causal laws" that make psychoanalysis an understandable and effective worldview (p. 167). In his view, this ren-

ders the relational view of selfhood incoherent because it is "multiple, pluralistic, nominalistic, thus *relative* to person, place, and time" (p.167). Mills warns that treading too far down this conceptual path "introduces a plurality of contradictory essences" (p. 170) that "dissolves the centrality of the self, extracts and dislocates the subject from subjectivity, (and) decomposes personal identity" (p. 169).

Mills's critique is erudite and far-ranging; here I will focus on two of its many elements that seem to me to best illuminate the tensions between sexual personae fueling modernist/post-modernist debates. Interesting from a Paglian perspective is that in his article Mills explicitly identifies a feminizing quality to post-modern theory, and warns us against its seductions, suggesting that post-modern psychoanalysis needs to reject Freud, whom he says "is seen as a cold, depriving, critical father figure for the fantasy of the unconditional acceptance, warmth, nurturance, empathy, and reciprocal recognition from an idealised loving mother who forms the role model for a way of being in the consulting room" (p. 176). Here he identifies himself with the Apollonian father, Freud, and the deep suspicion of feminizing Dionysian energies that Freud evinced in relation to Jung and Ferenczi.

This identification with Freud, and the intergenerational transmission of the Freudian paternal order that it engenders, appears again when Mills resurrects whole cloth Freud's belief that challenges to psychoanalysis imply the presence of unresolved Oedipal strivings. He reapplies this interpretation to the current crop of post-modern psychoanalysts by suggesting that an "unresolved Oedipus complex" may motivate their project, such that perhaps they seek to do away with Freud and his original ideas so as to "recover the lost presence of an idealisable, albeit fallible, mother" (p. 176). Mills cites Ferenczi as an early example of this Oedipally-motivated turn toward the maternal, repeating a line from one of Ferenczi's letters that criticizes psychoanalytic theory and technique as possessing, in Ferenczi's words, "too little love and too much severity" (p. 176). The revival of this ninety-year-old citation for use as a warning to a new generation of psychoanalysts about the dangers of a "maternalised" analysis points to the undying nature of the clash between sexual personae.

At one point in his treatise Mills argues that all the core elements of the allegedly "new" insights of post-modern psychoanalysis (such as the relational nature of the dynamic unconscious, attachment needs, and so on) are either clearly anticipated or contained *in toto* in Freud's writings. Hence, says Mills, "it was Freud who first explained how relationality was made possible through the transmogrification of drives" (p. 173). He goes a big step further, claiming not only that Freud was first to address the relational nature of the psyche, but also that he did so *better* than contemporary theorists, creating a theory more genuinely reflective of a "two-person" psychology than anything offered up by current relational and inter-subjective thinkers. Whether true or not, this position would seem to ascribe ultimate creative power to Freud, in the same way that some philosophers deem all Western thought a footnote to Plato.

Arguably, in the above position Mills envisions Freud as a kind of "unmoved mover," complete and sufficient unto himself, out of whose mind all the core elements of psychoanalysis are born with their essential features present or even fully-formed. In this view, all subsequent theoretical developments are made second-order emendations to, or elaborations of, Freud's original creative act. I suggest that the ascription of primary creative power to Freud is a type of male creation myth, one continuing the Western Apollonian narrative of male-as-primal-creator of which Paglia and

Irigaray speak, by reversing the biological order so as to reclaim the birthing function from woman. In so doing, Mills re-envisions history through the male homo-erotic lens that Paglia claims is the basis of Western Apollonian consciousness[2].

The call to identify with the imago of Freud as guiding patriarch is also front-and-center in the recent work of Chessik (2007), whose book *The Future of Psychoanalysis* argues that we must realign ourselves with Freud's original ideas or face the possible destruction of our profession. Chessik shares and seeks to revive Freud's dread of unscientific "occultism," sounding the alarm about what he deems to be the infestation of psychoanalysis with solipsistic, dreamy-eyed theories like post-modernism, which he prophesises will "shipwreck our science on the rocks of nihilism, chaos, mysticism, and disrepute" (p. 12). This is classic Apollonian indignation, deeply rooted in Western tradition. In this quote, Chessik invokes the famous scene of sexual danger from the *Odyssey*, in which wily and macho Odysseus has himself tied to the mast of his ship so that he may hear, but not surrender to, the seductive melodies of the Sirens, who seek to lure him to his death on the rocky shoreline. Like Jim in "Doctor Fell," Odysseus is a man who knows what it means to hurt so *good*.

Chessik refers to the current embrace of post-modern multiplicity as the result of a professional "failure of nerve." By this he means that North American psychoanalysts have succumbed to social pressure from insurers, drug companies, and biological psychiatry to water down Freud's vision, substituting the gold of his pain-staking, intra-psychic "archaeological" focus with the dross of inter-subjective and relational theories promising what he decries as the easy, "fast, fast, fast relief" that consumer culture craves. Intriguing from a Paglian viewpoint is Chessik's use of the phrase "failure of nerve" to explain why we have allowed psychoanalysis to edge toward disreputable mysticism — a macho choice of descriptors if there ever was one. It is not a random and meaningless "throw away" comment, but rather an idea central enough to Chessik's argument that he uses it in a chapter title ("The Contemporary Failure of Nerve and the Crisis of Psychoanalysis," p. 157). It brings to mind the classically American cinematic image of a sergeant in the heat of battle who, confronted with an emotionally faltering young private, slaps the whimpering lad across the face and screams "Get a hold of your self, boy!" Paglia would agree with Chessik's sense of alarm, saying that paternal social orders cannot indulge failing nerves: men must stand their ground, aggressively erect like the aroused phallus, or face incorporation by maternal nature and her Siren-song seductions. In this case, the alluring seduction comes to us in what Chessik deems the deceptively undemanding ironies of post-modern psychoanalysis.

Concluding Thoughts: the Duality of Desire and Possibilities for Communion

Following Freud, Paglian essentialism reflects a pre-Christian world-view, imbued with the classical Greek notion that true religiosity means acceptance of life's terrible dualities including sexual duality—as decreed by fate. If we are to believe Paglia, masculine and feminine personae and their agendas are quite different, and so will always clash. Yet, they are also related in an eternally recurring dance of

2. For clarity's sake, I should note that, while I said earlier that Stern also implicitly celebrates the psychoanalytic man-womb, I argued that he does so as a way of welcoming Dionysian forces into practice. That is, he examines the breaking down of self/other distinctions (including those of sex and gender) that post-modernism sees as necessary for the fruitful mingling of subjectivities. In contrast to Stern, Mills appropriates female procreative primacy and ascribes this to Freud for exactly *opposite* reasons, namely, to assert Apollonian values of male self-containment and independence: man as creator of his own being, dwelling in splendid, self-sufficient isolation

opposites. What starts out as attraction can easily turn into repulsion, and vice-versa; hence, the Janus-faced nature of desire, painfully familiar to all lovers.

Also, like Freud, Paglia asserts the ubiquitous nature of these two-pronged sexual tensions in all human undertakings. If we accept this premise, we may also conclude that relations between the conservative, order-preserving Apollonian Freudians and boundary-crossing, structure-dismantling Dionysian post-moderns are not different from that between warring lovers. Or, more accurately, their clash reflects the antagonism between potential lovers who don't yet realise the full nature and implications of their desires. It occurs to me that this is also a common dynamic among grade school boys and girls who also do not yet recognise their sexual wishes for each other, but never-the-less get much pleasure from mutual torment. Behind the squabbling, we infer the presence of curiosity, attraction, and a desire for union, all of it as yet unconscious. While Paglia would say that the inherent structures and energies of the sexual personae forbid a final, lasting peace between them, we may reasonably wonder if interpretation of their respective dynamisms may calm things a bit, perhaps moving both sides toward moments of mutual recognition.

The best love-making often occurs after a good fight. Likewise, the most creative dialogue between warring parties in a debate about theory may also occur only after a period of mutual recrimination and hatred. Once the competing bodies of psychoanalysis have moved from their respective fixations in a latency psychology, with its characteristic misrecognition of desire, and into the self-possession of young adulthood, they may also figure out what to do, practically, with their tremendous ambivalence toward one another. Hatred may give way to curiosity. And who knows; in time, they may even develop an interest in cross-fertilisation.

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